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INTRODUCTION: 
The historiography of nineteenth-century savings banks is rather dull.  For the most
part it is the work   ￿insiders ￿ engaged in commemorative history, either long-serving
executives of the institutions they describe or else authors specially commissioned by the
institution in question.  Sepia photographs of soberly dressed bank officials and
unprepossessing buildings tend to be a strong feature of savings banks histories (e.g. Horne,
1947; McCreary, 1991; Campbell, 1985;  Tyrrell, 1947; Moss and Russell, 1994; Manning,
1917; Sherman, 1934; Orcutt, 1934).
Nor do savings banks themselves have any of the glamour of contemporaneous
innovations such as the powerloom or the railway engine.  What could be more boring that
the story of institutions which didn ￿t even expose themselves to the risk of lending money
and which for the most part were cautiously and competently run?  Well, I believe savings
banks are worth studying, if less for their own sake than for what they can tell us about the
economy and economic behaviour more broadly.  
During the Industrial Revolution there was no shortage of schemes encouraging the
poor to save.  Such schemes were particularly directed at  ￿industrious and frugal ￿ servants and
tradesmen, and more generally at those who might easily be reduced to destitution by
unemployment, illness, or old age.  Saving for a rainy day might have been second nature to
the businessman and the farmer; not so, it was held, the labourer or the servant.  One early
proponent claimed that saving was not  ￿an intuitive faculty of the mind ￿, and needed to be
taught, like reading and writing. 
In 1793 the British parliament passed a scheme to promote friendly societies, but such
societies were soon being criticised for being wasteful and too narrowly focused.  Of several
schemes to encourage working-class thrift the most important would prove to be the2
provident institution or trustee savings bank.  Histories of savings banks usually identify their
founder as Rev. Henry Duncan who opened a savings bank in a cottage in the hamlet of
Ruthwell near Dumfries in lowland Scotland in 1810.   As it happened, the rules governing
Duncan ￿s bank were too complex and Ruthwell too small for his model to offer the
prototype of a thriving savings bank, but key features of his plan   ￿   low minimum deposit,
ease of withdrawal, and an attractive return on savings   ￿   would endure.  Three years later a
savings bank was founded in Edinburgh; its less cumbersome structure and rules would
prove more influential than Duncan ￿s model.
There were two important differences between the Ruthwell and Edinburgh models. 
First, Ruthwell ￿s board of trustees was elected by the members, whereas Edinburgh ￿s was a
self-perpetuating group of middle-class philanthropists.  Second, while the Ruthwell model
required that trustees monitor the character of savers, Edinburgh ignored this constricting
and time-consuming stipulation.  The Ruthwell model capitalized on the face-to-face
character of village society, but the viability of savings banks required towns and cities rather
than villages.
The new concept spread very rapidly throughout the UK.  It became fashionable for
the middle classes and the gentry to become involved in banks as trustees, patrons, or part-
time managers.  Ricardo and Malthus were managers of a savings bank set up in London by
Joseph Hume in 1816, and for a time Ricardo was one of the driving forces behind another
established near his country seat at Gatcomb Park in 1817. Such people saw themselves as
enlightened philanthropists. As Ricardo confided to a friend,  ￿the rich have no other personal
object in view excepting the interest which every man must have in good government   ￿  and
in the general prosperity ￿.  But the desire to make the poor industrious was coupled with a
self-interested concern to reduce the nuisances of poor relief and street begging.  Edinburgh ￿s
first attempt at launching a savings bank emanated from the city ￿s Society for the Suppression
of Beggars.  And it was no accident that the first location of Belfast ￿s savings bank  was an
annex to the local house of industry and that the famous Irish Poor Inquiry of the mid-1830s
included an investigation into charitable savings and credit institutions.  The system thus3
embodied a paternalism that seemed to unite the interest of rich and poor.  But this was at
the expense of the poor having to reveal their saving habits to their betters.
In Ireland official thinking behind the savings banks is well illustrated in the following
piece of propaganda from a mid-1830s school textbook,  Irish National School Reading Book No.
4:
When a poor man has saved up a little money, he generally puts
it into the Funds as it is called, or deposits it in a savings bank,
which does this for him;  he is then one of the Government ￿s
creditors...  and all Government creditors, that is, all who have
money in the Funds, or in the savings banks, receive their share
of it as a just debt.
So influential was the support for the new institutions at the outset that parliamentary
backing was soon forthcoming.  Separate acts to encourage the spread of savings banks in
Ireland and in England fixed the rate of interest payable at a very generous 3d per cent per
diem or 4.55 per cent per annum, limited depositors to investments of £50 per annum in
Ireland and £100 in Britain, and exempted bank transactions from stamp duties.  [These rates
and limits would change later.]  They also prohibited trustees from having a financial interest
in a savings bank.  As a confidence-building measure the legislation also stipulated that the
banks ￿ deposits be placed on account with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
National Debt.  
George Rose M.P., an elderly Tory and really the driving force behind the legislation,
believed that the spread of savings banks would  ￿gradually do away [with] the evils of the
system of poor laws ￿.  Such sentiments led to the fear in some quarters that savers would risk
losing their entitlement to parish relief, which explains why Rose ￿s act contained a clause
guaranteeing savers against that eventuality.  Against the objection that the legislation had not
been demanded by those whom it sought to protect,  Rose argued that  ￿both the principle and
the detail of such an institution was beyond the common ideas of persons engaged in daily4
and manual labour ￿.
George Rose ￿s scheme relied on a combination of public and private subsidy.  While
the high interest rate guaranteed by his plan and the prestige lent by gentry involvement were
crucial, philanthropic volunteering was also essential in monitoring the banks ￿ activities
thereafter.  The new institutions aimed to offer their clients three things: a relatively attractive
return on their savings, considerable liquidity, and security.  In the mid-1810s they spread like
wildfire.  By the end of 1818 there were nearly five hundred savings banks in Great Britain. 
The rate of growth tapered off thereafter.
CRITIQUES: 
Some radicals (like William Cobbett) saw the savings banks as a cunning way of
getting rid of the entitlement to poor relief.  While undoubtedly some supporters of savings
banks were hard-line Malthusians who wanted an end to all poor relief, there is also a
distinction between entitlement and the need for poor relief.  More soundly based was the
quickly-emerging critique that the banks really were not helping those for whom they were
intended, and that the benefits were being captured by the middle and lower-middle classes. 
By the early 1820s even Ricardo ￿s initial enthusiasm had turned to lukewarm support: and he
now  wanted deposits locked in and the rate of interest payable reduced.   This is a point that
would be rediscovered in the 1950s and 1960s by Neil Smelser (1959) and Albert Fishlow
(1961).
GROWTH IN IRELAND: 
In Ireland diffusion lagged, but only very slightly, behind the rest of the UK.  The
most active years for creating savings banks were 1818 and 1819.   As in Britain the banks
relied on local grandees to lend prestige, and on clergymen, and professionals and
businessmen to provide the initiative and to act as trustees or managers.  This sense of noblesse5
oblige (or its bourgeois equivalent) was a crucial aspect.  In general the management was
ecumenical in composition.  
Ireland ￿s first savings bank was established in Stillorgan in 1815, but it seems not to
have lasted long.  The first successful bank, the Belfast Savings Bank, opened for business in
January 1816.  It was followed the Edinburgh model.  Thereafter though Ulster took the lead,
banks were soon set up throughout the island.  By late 1829 there were 73 savings banks in
Ireland.  On the eve of the famine there were 95,348 depositors in 76 savings banks holding
balances totalling nearly £3 million.  
The Irish savings bank network had been essentially established by the mid-1820s.  Of
the 74 Irish banks still open in late 1846 46 had been created in 1816-25, a further 21 in
1826-35, and only seven from 1836 on.  Long-established banks best withstood the pressures
of the late 1840s (on which more later).  Of the 52 founded before 1826 six had gone by the
wayside by 1848; of the 29 founded in 1926-35, eight failed by 1848; of the twelve founded in
1836 or later, five had folded by 1848.  The earlier savings banks were also bigger.   
On the eve of the famine the population of Ireland was more than half that of
England & Wales, and more than double that of Scotland.  Yet Ireland had only half as many
savings banks as Scotland, and about one-sixth as many as England and Wales.  Part of the
reason for this is that banks fared best in commercialized urban settings, whereas Ireland was
overwhelmingly rural.  In Ireland as in the rest of the UK account-holders were
disproportionately urban, with four of the main cities (Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Belfast)
holding two-fifths of all accounts.  In Dublin in 1846 two big savings banks held about
25,000 accounts in a city of about ten times as many people.  In Belfast the ratio of accounts
to population was about the same.  And likewise in Cork, then Ireland ￿s second city.
In Ireland the banks were more likely to be located in the more developed parts of the
country.  On the eve of the famine the province of Connacht, poorest and least urbanised,
and worst affected by the famine, accounted for 17 per cent of the population but only 4 per
cent of the savings held in savings banks. The correlation across Ireland ￿s thirty-two counties
between the average deposit per capita and one common measure of living standards, poor6
law valuation per head, was 0.59.  The correlation between a second measure, male literacy in
a county, and average deposit per head in the same county was 0.53.   So the irony is that the
banks were fewest where really poor people were most numerous.
WHO SAVED?  
The initial motivation behind the banks and their parliamentary supporters was to get
the poor to save.  In this respect the banks ￿ record was mixed at best.  Qualitative accounts
suggest that the poor were not the main beneficiaries.  The 1835-6 Irish Poor Inquiry
suggests that farmers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen were much more likely to use the savings
banks than labourers, though servants also feature prominently in the categories listed. 
Tellingly the very first annual report of the Cork Savings Bank (founded in 1817) noted that
many depositors were too prosperous to deserve its benefits, adding that  ￿this species of
deposits, if continued, would eventually close the Bank, as no gentleman could be got to give
their time gratuitously as Managers to conduct the money dealings of their equals and in
many cases their superiors in rank and property ￿.  The sense that the very same savings banks
had been  ￿captured ￿ by the middle classes is also evident in an indignant editorial in the
Southern Reporter in the wake of a run on it in April 1848.  Noting that a single family had
served notice to withdraw upwards of £400 on the following Saturday, it fulminated: 
We do not know whether other establishments of the kind are similarly
circumstanced: but we do know something of the management here, which has
 ￿let us into a secret ￿ about the causes of the apparent panic in our city.  Does
(the £350,000 on deposit) belong to our poor? Are they parties whose vulgar
fears have caused all the monetary alarm to which we have been subjected? 
No such thing.  The depositors are not the humble classes.  We know the fact
to be so.  Their whole deposits in the bank, though for them alone its benefits
were intended, are not estimated to amount to more than £60,000!  The rest7
has been lodged in evasion of the law by people of a class which was never
meant to have the privilege of depositing in it...  The present run on the Cork
Savings Bank is not their (i.e. the poor) act, but that of persons who should
never, had proper care been taken by its management, been allowed to deposit
in it.
Similarly the local gentry funding the small bank in Carrickmacross stopped doing so in 1849
because depositors were  ￿principally of a class superior to those for whose benefit the
institution was originally intended ￿.
Hard data on the savers ￿ socio-economic status confirm such impressions.  There are several
ways of getting at the background of savers.  
[1]  One indication is the average sum held per depositor at any one time (see Table 6). 
In 1837, for example, the average sum deposited in Ireland was £28.  Not only did
that represent about three times Irish per capita income, but it was more than the
average sums deposited in either England (£31) or Wales (£29).  In mid-century the
Irish average (£28) was marginally higher than the English (£26) or or the Welsh
(£27), and double the Scottish (£14).  Given that income per head in Ireland  was then
probably less than half that of the rest of the United Kingdom, this suggests that Irish
depositors came from further up the income distribution than those in the UK.  
The high average sums deposited would suggest that in both Ireland and
England  money which should have gone to the joint-stock or country banks was
diverted into the savings banks.  Scotland was different: its savings banks were best at
targeting those for whom they were intended, and the average deposits there were
lowest  in all occupational categories.  An important reason for this is that Scotland ￿s
more developed joint-stock banking system meant more competition for the savings
of the better off than in either  Ireland or England.  In Scotland the commercial banks8
paid good interest on deposits accounts, but most Irish commercial banks paid very
low rates, and the dominant Bank of Ireland paid none until forced by competition to
do so in 1865 (Paine, 1966; Fishlow, 1961; Ó Gráda, 1994: 357-9).
 
[2] The breakdowns by occupation corroborates (Table 2).  Had the savings banks
been mainly about  ￿encouraging and rewarding the industry and self-denial of the
working classes ￿, savers in categories 7 (labourers, servants, journeymen), 8 (domestic
servants, nurses, etc.), and 9 (dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans) should have
dominated.  In England and Wales these three combined accounted for 41 per cent of
deposits and 37 per cent of accounts.  In Scotland they accounted for 37 and 38 per
cent.  In Ireland, however, they accounted for only 16.5 and 23 per cent, respectively. 
Variations in the structure of the labour force could not account for the difference:  it
is clear that the unskilled and the lowly skilled formed a much smaller proportion of
savers in Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom.  Tradesmen (a category
which includes farmers) and women without a reported occupation were
proportionately more important in Ireland.  Since Irish labourers and servants were
much poorer than their English or Welsh peers, it is perhaps reassuring to find that
those of them who saved, saved less.  However, the high averages in Irish trust
accounts and in the accounts of minors are suspicious, as are those of gentlemen and
professionals.  See also Table 4 on the Wexford Savings Bank.
[3]  Comparing the average sizes of deposits and withdrawals from savings banks
offers another clue (Table 5).  If the clients of savings banks were mainly men and
women of modest means who saved incremently one might expect the average
withdrawal to exceed the average deposit.  Nowhere were accounts very active;
everywhere the number of deposits per account exceeded the number of withdrawals. 
In both England and Wales and in Scotland the average withdrawal was much bigger
than the average deposit, but this was not so in Ireland.  Note too that the average9
deposit was highest in Ireland by a comfortable margin.
 
[4] In the UK the average deposit fell from £33 in 1830 to £25 in 1852.  This is
interpreted by Albert Fishlow  as evidence of very small deposits by new savers.  In
Ireland, however, the trend in the average deposit size was up for most of this period. 
The aggregate sum deposited in Ireland grew much faster than in England between
1833 and 1845   ￿   at a rate of nearly six per cent per annum.   
[5] The size-distributions of accounts in individual Irish savings banks also suggest
that many of them did not cater primarily for the very poor.  Nearly-two thirds of the
savings were held in the 47,318 accounts worth between £20 and £100.  Note that on
the eve of the famine Irish GDP per capita was £10-£12, while a farm labourer ￿s
annual wage averaged £10 or less.  In Dublin and Belfast the preponderance of small
accounts suggests that those on modest incomes were better represented.  On the eve
of the famine a clear majority of accounts (62 per cent in Dublin, 55 per cent in
Belfast) contained £20 or less.  However, in Cork and Limerick savings banks the
proportions holding £20 or less were much lower   ￿  39 and 36 per cent.  In the
towns of Castlebar and Boyle, located in the impoverished west,  the proportions were
only 33 and 36 per cent.
All these data strongly imply that Irish savings banks did not target primarily those that their
founders had in mind. 
THURLES SAVINGS BANK:
Thurles Savings Bank opened for business in late 1829 and folded in 1871.  There is
an excellent account of the bank by James O ￿Shea who discovered its rich records, unique for
Ireland, in the 1980s (O ￿Shea, 1989).  Its ledgers corroborate the point about the banks being10
mainly a vehicle for the more comfortable and better off.  Thurles held over four thousand
accounts in all.  The spread of opening lodgements is worth remarking on (Figure 1).  More
than one-third (1,630 out of 4,213) were for exactly the maximum permitted sum of £30. 
Note too the peaks at £5, £10, and £20.  Quite plainly children ￿s accounts were used to
overcome the regulation that no single account be augmented by more that £30 in a single
year.  The opening deposits in trust accounts tended to be bigger than average.  Only 8.5 per
cent of them were of £5 or under, compared to 18.5 per cent of all opening deposits. 
Moreover, nearly three-fifths of the opening deposits of exactly £30 were trust accounts, and
a much higher proportion of trust accounts (52.6 per cent) were at the upper limit of £30
(Figure 2).
In Thurles in the 1829-1846 period deposits exceeded withdrawals in each year with
the exception of 1840 and 1842 (Figure 3).  However, in 1834-36 there were substantial
withdrawals (£11,265 against £14,340 deposited).   This may well have been due to the
opening of a branch of the National Bank in the town in 1835 and a branch of the
Agricultural and Commercial Bank in the following year.  The opening of a branch of the
new Tipperary Bank in 1840 may also have some drawn accounts away from the Thurles
Savings Bank.  Perhaps too reductions interest on deposits in savings banks had also
something to do with it?
Note first of all that the two main poor categories, labourers and servants, are
underrepresented (Table 12).  For example, labourers accounted for half the labour force on
the eve of the Famine, but for only one saver in fifty.  In effect the Thurles Savings Bank was
a farmers ￿ bank.  More than one account holder in four was described as a farmer or a
member of a farming family, and it is clear from the ledgers that a significant number of
those described merely as  ￿minors ￿,  ￿spinsters ￿,  ￿widows ￿, and  ￿married women ￿ were also from
farming families.  These categories were to the fore throughout the bank ￿s history.
  The impression that  ￿very few of the lower orders take advantage of the saving bank ￿
is confirmed by a close scrutiny of the records.  Table 12 summarises the profile of savers. 
The table contains some expected and some perhaps surprising features.  The low average11
opening balances of servants and labourers are expected, those of tailors and bakers perhaps
less so.  They betoken the lowly economic status of those occupations in the area.  At the
other end of the spectrum are landlowners and gentlemen, the groups with the highest
average maximum balance.  The closeness of opening, closing, and maximum balances for
farmers, farmers ￿ wives, and farmers ￿ children are interesting.  They suggest that farmers used
the accounts of family members to extract maximum benefit from the bank.
  In general the picture is of rather inactive accounts, with an average of just a few
transactions a year.   The number of deposits typically exceeded withdrawals.  This seems to
have been typical of nineteenth-century savings banks.  The average closing balance exceeded
the average opening balance in all occupational categories.  This suggests that the bank was
used as a vehicle for accumulation.  The average account was held for about five years, with
little variation here across occupations or parishes.  However, it was quite common for
account-holders to close their accounts and re-open another later.  
In the prefamine period the Thurles actuary took down a high proportion of account
holders ￿ ages, though hardly any after 1845.  The significant proportion of accounts in the
names of children (11 per cent) and juveniles (12 per cent) again suggests that these were used
to circumvent the rules.
SCALE AND COST:
Many savings banks, at least at the outset, did not operate on fully commercial criteria,
relying instead on unpaid part-time staff and on free or subsidised premises with alternative
uses outside banking hours.  Even in the mid-nineteenth century a quarter of the staff were
unpaid, and one office in four rent-free.  Some savings banks were located in town halls, and
operated from premises that were also used by grand juries or petty sessions, or even as
lending libraries or dispensaries.  In Ireland several doubled up as premises for the local loan
fund.  Where modest premises could be rented for weekly or fortnightly use and where
managers were part-timers and paid accordingly, small could also be beautiful.  However,12
since the number of transactions per account-holder was typically small, with even a part-time
professional staff viability required a sizeable number of accounts.  This explains why savings
banks were more likely to locate in bigger towns.  In Ireland, though, many were still located
in very small towns on the eve of the famine.  In 1845 eighteen towns with populations of
less than two thousand contained a savings bank.  Most of the banks in such places were
small: the correlation between town size and aggregate deposits was very high (over +0.9). 
The average sum deposited in banks in towns of less than two thousand inhabitants in 1846
was £10,772, compared to £14,660 in towns of 2,000-4,999 inhabitants, £28,105 in towns of
5,000-9,999 inhabitants, £46,520 in towns of 10,000-19,999 inhabitants, and £265,160 in
towns and cities of over 20,000.  This suggests that many of the savings banks were located in
unpromising places.  These banks, typically small, seem to have been the creations of resident
landlords for the most part.  The landlord connection is also reflected in the added function
of several Irish savings banks offices still operating in 1850 as rent offices.   In Scotland a
savings bank office occasionally doubled up as a commercial bank office, but never as a rent
office.  Since a bank ￿s catchment area was largely determined by walking distance, with the
great majority of customers living with 10-12 miles of their bank, small-town and village
savings banks were at a distinct disadvantage.
The number of depositors was also strongly correlated with the size of the town in
which a bank was located.  Thus the biggest savings banks were those in Dublin, Cork,
Belfast, Limerick, and Waterford.   The smallest were in Killough, Co. Down (25 accounts,
population 1,148), Tyrellspass, Co. Westmeath (104 accounts, population 623), Cootehill, Co.
Cavan (107 accounts, population 2,425), and Castleknock, Co. Dublin (139 accounts,
population 156). 
Aggregate data for 1848 suggest that Irish banks were smaller and costlier to run than
those in Britain (Table 1).  The average annual cost per account was 1.8 times that in England
and Wales and three times that in Scotland.  The cost per pound deposited was also higher in
Ireland, though by a smaller margin. More detailed data on the cost structure of the savings
banks are available for 1850, by which time the dust had settled in Ireland.  They report the13
size of each bank (defined either by total deposits or the number of account holders) in the
United Kingdom in operation in 1850-2 as well as its management costs.  The same sources
list the number of both unpaid and paid staff and the total wage-bill, the rate of interest paid
on deposits, running costs as a percentage of the bank ￿s capital, and the number of business
days in a year.  Simple cross-section regressions using data on 42 Scottish and 52 Irish savings
banks in 1850 yielded estimates of average cost per transaction and of total cost relative to
capital which put Irish savings banks of all sizes, but especially the larger ones, at a
considerable disadvantage.  Note too that unit cost declined with size in both Ireland and
Scotland.
 
PANICS AND CONTAGION:  
The history of savings banks would be much duller were it not for their occasional
exposure to runs or panics.  These panics, from which the banks never truly recovered, 
exposed a weakness in their original design.  
In Ireland the record of the savings banks in this respect was quite good:  only one
serious case of embezzlement came to light before the late 1840s, and there were two more in
April 1848.  But this was enough to give rise to a panic that almost destroyed the whole
system.   The first bank to be cheated by its actuary or manager, the Cuffe Street Savings
Bank in Dublin, had been mismanaged since the 1820s, and should have been closed long
before its final demise in 1848.  Much more damaging were the sensational, unrelated
collapses of the Tralee and Killarney savings banks in April 1848.  Both failures were due to
dodgy actuaries and lax management by the trustees.  Both produced much adverse publicity
for savings banks.  They illustrated how vulnerable other banks had been, and also
highlighted showed that the rules about deposit ceilings were flouted in Kerry.  These Kerry
failures, for which nobody received compensation, had major contagion effect throughout
the country.
In Tralee the actuary had operated the business from his own house,  ￿which afforded14
him considerable latitude for carrying on his frauds ￿.  Since depositors called at all hours with
their deposits there were no managers present to check entries.  One of his scams worked as
follows.  Deposits of £30, £15, and £27 would be entered as £3, £5, and £7, and a sum of
£15 added to the coffers.  The manager would see that the sum lodged matched the entries. 
Then he would add a zero to the £3 and change the £5 to £15 and the £7 to £27, so that
depositors who came to claim their money would get it.  In this way suspicions were not
aroused.  The actuary, on a salary of £60, pocketed about £28,000 between 1832 and 1848,
though in 1848  ￿he appeared to have had but £3,000 realised ￿.  The Killarney Savings Bank,
which held over one thousand accounts, closed its doors on 18 April 1848.  In this case the
actuary fled, leaving liabilities of £36,000 against assets of £16,582.
An official investigator, John Tidd Pratt, was appointed to look into the plight of the
two Kerry banks.  His findings created a sensation.  He found  ￿the greatest abuse had[d]
existed on the part of the depositors, with respect to their mode of depositing, and the
amounts they invested, as well as an utter disregard to the rates ￿, but Irish politicians and the
press sympathised the depositors.  Tidd Pratt defended himself in a letter from Killarney to
the Freeman ￿s Journal in which he revealed that the average deposit in Tralee had been £40
 ￿and in this place will exceed £50 ￿.  One depositor had made claims amounting to £1,000, and
others had claimed £800, £650, £450, £320, and so on.  In no savings bank in the United
Kingdom had he ever found  ￿so great a number of what I consider large accounts. ￿  He added
that his duty was  ￿far from being a pleasant one ￿.  
As numerous Tralee account-holders handed in their pass books to the clerk, it
emerged that  ￿some of the farming class, apparently poor, had sums to a surprising amount
lodged   ￿  even over a thousand pounds each ￿.  Similarly in the wake of the collapse of the
Killarney savings bank,   ￿tenants, who pleaded extreme poverty to their landlords, paupers
from the workhouse, and men whose outward appearance would lead you to look on them as
objects of charity, were soon at the office door ￿.  In colorful evidence to a Commons select
committee on savings banks in 1849 Tidd Pratt spoke of  ￿cases where husbands brought
books representing the money to be the property of their sisters, and upon calling the sisters15
it turned out to be their wives ￿, and of  ￿persons producing books before me stating it was not
their own property, but was the property of their nephews and nieces; and upon my
informing them that their nephews and nieces must come themselves, when the children
came it was quite clear that they had never seen the book ￿.  Another man  ￿had a large sum of
money in the bank, and it had been stated that if he was pressed [for rent] they must sell his
bed under him, and several cases of that kind ￿.  His report to the Lords of the Treasury, no
doubt accurately, described the claimants as belonging  ￿to a class of persons for whom these
institutions were never intended ￿.  But he lacked evidence for his assertions that many had
invested in the savings banks in order to avoid paying rent, and that others were in receipt of
indoor or outdoor poor relief.  
Tidd Pratt ￿s report was presented on 18 May 1848.  Its accusations were widely
circulated in the domestic and foreign press and widely repeated later.  Henry Arthur Herbert,
M.P. for Kerry, declared that he had seen them repeated in the Augsburg Gazette.  In the
Commons and before the select committee on savings banks of which he was a member
Herbert vigorously rebutted Tidd Pratt ￿s claims.  The claim that three prisoners in jail for
debt  ￿had presented themselves in custody of their gaolers to claim as depositors ￿ was
rebutted with a letter from the governor of the jail that  ￿no such circumstance ever occurred ￿. 
Tidd Pratt was forced to withdraw his accusation before the committee.  Nor was their any
evidence either for his most colorful claim that workhouse inmates had claimed deposits
back.  Herbert was given the names of four inmates who, according to the workhouse master,
applied for dismissal at the time of Tidd Pratt ￿s hearings, and  ￿whom some of the inmates of
the workhouse had accused, in a joking way, of having money in the bank ￿.  Herbert engaged
a friend to search the list of applicants appearing before Tidd Pratt for the four names, but
none could be found.
The impact of the sensational failures in Dublin and Kerry was far-reaching.  In Cork
the trustees of the local bank were forced to withdraw £45,000 of their investment in the
national debt during the first half of April 1848 in order to meet a serious run.  
What kind of saver panicked during these runs?  This is the focus of related analysis16
done with Morgan Kelly and Eugene White on savers who were involved in runs against the
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank in New York in 1854 and 1857.  Neither of these panics
destroyed the bank (obviously) though the second made it almost insolvent.  We focus on
closed accounts rather than sums withdrawn, though a case could be made for looking at
sums withdrawn too.  The wealth of the EISB allow us to draw detailed profiles of panickers
and non-panickers so we can see whether the two groups differed systematically.  One way of
doing this is to set a straightforward logit/probit model with characteristics of the saver and
of the account predicting the outcome.  The outcome of an earlier effort along these lines
with Eugene White are given in Tables 8 and 9.  In ongoing work Eugene White and I are
playing around with a better data set and alternative time-variant hazard model.
The results I present here from Ireland are less formal and less striking (Table 11). 
They concern the Thurles Savings Bank where the total sum deposited plummeted from
£10,108 in 1845 to £2,823 in 1849.  The drop was mainly a by-product of the failures in
Killarney and Tralee.  More people closed their accounts in 1848 than in any other year in the
Thurles Savings Bank ￿s history.  We focus here on the period April-September 1848, when
322 accounts were closed.  We are interested in whether those who panicked were
systematically different from those who did not.  We accordingly compare the closers with
two other sets of account-holders: first, the 341 account-holders who closed their accounts in
1843-5; second, the 384 who closed in between January 1847 and March 1848; third, the 310
who closed in 1849-51; and finally, the 482 who held accounts in March 1848 but chose not
to close them in the following months.
Note first the apparent absence of any strong gender affect: women, it seems, were
slightly less inclined to panic, but the difference in the proportion of female closers in the five
groups is small.  The opening and closing balances of those who panicked hardly differed
from the balances of those who did not.  Account-holders with addresses in Thurles were
slightly more inclined to panic but again the effect is small.  There is little evidence of
panickers clustering by parish.  Two differences are more significant.  During the panic
account-holders with the same surname and address were more likely to close.  Farmers and17
members of farming households were also more likely to close, while people of means, such
as landowners, clergy, and professionals, were less likely to do so.  It is hardly surprising that
when parents closed accounts, they also closed those of their children.  That networks of
occupation, sex, or parish did not register may reflect secrecy about accounts.  People kept
quiet about their savings?  That servants and labourers were also marginally more likely to
keep their accounts open is perhaps more surprising.  
WITHDRAWALS IN MARCH 1856:
There was another peak in account closures in Thurles in March 1856.  This stemmed
from the sensational failure of the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank, which had a branch in the
town since 1840.  The failure was due to the frauds of John Sadleir M.P., who had used the
bank to finance his disastrous speculations.  Sadleir, a controversial figure in Irish politics,
lived mostly in London, but exercised full control of the Tipperary Bank ￿s funds through his
brother James.  The bank suspended payments on 19 February in the wake of Sadleir ￿s
suicide on Hampstead Heath in London.  Most Irish banks came under pressure in the
following months.  La Touche ￿s Bank, the National and the Belfast approached the Bank of
Ireland for accommodation, though in the event only La Touche ￿s needed a loan.  By the end
of the year the crisis was over.  In Thurles, where the business of the Tipperary Bank had
been  ￿rather extensive ￿, both the National Bank and the Savings Bank came under some
pressure in the weeks following the collapse.  A local newspaper claimed that the panic did
not extend beyond  ￿the small farmer class ￿.
Had it been widely known that shortly before the collapse the trustees of the Thurles
Savings Bank had transferred their account from the National to the Tipperary Bank, the run
on the Thurles Savings Bank would surely have been more sustained.  For many years the
Thurles Savings Bank had held a balance of several hundred pounds with the National,
money that should technically have been deposited with the National Debt Office.  When the
National Bank announced in mid-1855 that it was about to reduce the rate of interest on18
those deposits from 2.5 to two per cent, whereas the Tipperary Bank committed to pay 2.5
per cent, the account was moved to Sadleir ￿s bank.  The decision, which cost the Thurles
Savings Bank nearly five hundred pounds, would haunt it till the end.  As resultant economy
measures, the trustees were forced in November 1858 to reduce the actuary ￿s salary by £10
and in May 1859 to reduce the interest payable on deposits to 2.5 per cent.
But what of those people who were driven to close their accounts in the Thurles
Savings Bank in February and March 1856?  See Table 10.  Were there any discernible
differences between them as a group and those who closed in  ￿normal ￿ times?  We compare
the seventy-five accounts closed during February and March 1856 with the 199 closed in
1853-55 and the 191 closed in 1857-58.  The profiles are quite similar in most respects. 
However, both average opening and closing balances were higher during the panic than
before it; farmers, members of farming families, and labourers were much more prominent
among closers in 1856 than either before or after; those who withdrew during the panic were
much more likely to be people with the same surname as other closers.  Policemen,
landowners, professional people, and the gentry were less inclined to panic.  This suggests
that family networks were an important influence on the decision to close an account.
CONCLUSION: 
History provides lots of examples of legislative projects with end results or outcomes
very different from what their supporters intended.  One need only instance aspects of
factory legislation, the old age pension in Ireland, the Common Agricultural Policy
throughout Europe.  Savings banks also fall into this category.  The avings banks were not a
conspiracy on the part of the middle class.  Envisaged as a means of reducing poverty, they
ended up benefitting mainly the lower-middle and middle classes.  In Ireland the gap between
the ideal and the reality was even greater.  It would be difficult and wrong to argue that the
savings banks did much harm.  But this institutional import resulted in greater abuse in19
Ireland than anywhere else in the UK, in the sense that the middle classes benefitted more
proportionately.
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TABLE 1:  BANKING COSTS
A.  IRELAND, ENGLAND/WALES, AND SCOTLAND IN 1848:
Ireland   E&W    Scotland
[1] Number      61     481        40
[2] Annual Cost (£)  9,148.8 88,421.8    4,913.8
[3] Accounts   50,119 909,336     85,472
[4] Deposits (£1,000)  1,358.1 25,371.2    1,080.2
[5]   [2]/[3]    0.18      0.10     0.06
[6]   [2]/[4]    6.74      3.49     4.55
B. IRELAND AND SCOTLAND, 1850
Sum deposited  ACA ACB
       (£) Scotland Ireland Scotland Ireland
    1,000 .074 .223 .117 .430
    2,000 .072 .223 .116 .429
    5,000 .066 .222 .116 .426
  10,000 .056 .221 .104 .421
  50,000 .033 .215 .103 .383
100,000 .014 .207 .090 .335
___________________________________________________________________TABLE 2: OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS, 1852
A.  PERCENTAGE OF DEPOSITS (£) IN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP:
  England  Wales           Scotland       Ireland
    1. Gentlemen      1.2        2.1       1.0   3.6
    2. Professional men      0.6    0.9   1.4   1.1
    3. Working in education (M+F)      1.2    0.2   0.1   1.5
    4. Tradesmen, etc. (*)    26.0   37.8 29.0 43.7
    5. Soldiers, mariners      2.2    2.2   0.6     3.8
    6.  Policemen, etc.      0.3    0.0   0.1   0.9
    7. Labourers, servants, journeymen    15.0         13.8 16.6     4.8
    8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)    24.0  17.9 20.3 11.0 
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans      2.1        0.1    0.4   0.7
  10. Married women, spinsters, widows    13.2  14.5      13.6   19.1 
  11. Minors      8.2    5.6        6.6        8.3 
  12. Trust accounts      1.5          1.9     0.1   1.0 
  13. Misc.      4.6            3.1      10.4   0.6 
      Total (£)            26,317,614   583,748                1,577,035           1,429,840
B. PERCENTAGE OF ACCOUNTS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP:
England Wales Scotland Ireland
    1. Gentlemen     1.1   2.5    1.2    3.0
    2. Professional men     0.5   1.0    0.8    0.8
    3. Working in education     1.0   0.0    0.1    1.5
    4. Tradesmen, etc.(*)   23.9 31.7  25.9  40.0
    5. Soldiers, mariners, etc.     1.6   2.2    0.5    2.9
    6. Policemen, etc.     0.2   0.0    0.1    0.6
    7. Labourers   12.6  15.2  16.3    7.2    8.  Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)   22.1  20.1  21.3  14.8
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans     2.4    0.1    0.4    1.1
  10. Married women, spinsters, widows   11.1  13.7  13.4  18.2
  11. Minors   16.3    9.9  11.6    8.3
  12. Trust accounts     2.1    1.3    0.1    1.0
  13. Misc.     5.0    2.2    8.4    0.6
Total 1,004,143 21,815 110,341 51,848
C. AVERAGE (£) BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
England Wales Scotland Ireland
    1. Gentlemen    28   22    12    33
    2. Professional men    29   24    24    38
    3. Working in education    32   43    15    27
    4. Tradesmen, etc.(*)    28   32    16    30
    5. Soldiers, mariners, etc.    35   27    17    36
    6. Policemen, etc.    34   33    13    39
    7. Labourers    31   24    15    18
    8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)    30   24    14    20
    9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female artisans    24   24    15    17
  10. Married women, widows, spinsters    32   28    15    29
  11. Minors    13   15      8    27
  12. Trust accounts    18   18    11    28
  13. Misc.    33   24    18    27
     Total (£)      26   27    14    28
(*) Tradesmen and their assistants, small farmers, clerks, mechanics, artisans not described as journeymen, and their wives_____________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3: SAVINGS AND DEPOSITS IN THE YEAR ENDING 20/11/1845
Depositors Number Avg. Deposit (nearest £)
 Up to £20 43,281     8
    £21-£50 35,311   31
  £51-£100 12,007   66
£101-£150   3,109 120
£151-£200   1,539 168
    >£200      101 227





TABLE 4: DEPOSITOR PROFILE, WEXFORD SAVINGS BANK 1841
Occupations (%)           Deposits (£)      Average (£)
    2 military   (0)      162.2   81.1 
  21 teachers   (1)   1,243.8   59.2 
140 with no trade   (8)   8,028.6   57.3 
162 persons in business   (9)   8,461.7   52.2 
  68 seafaring men   (4)   3,506.9   51.6
      5 doctors   (0)      202.7   40.5 
660 farmers (38) 24,908.1   37.7
  14 clergymen   (1)      519.1   37.1
    20 constabulary   (1)      731.6   36.6
102 working tradesmen   (6)   3,678.9   36.1
   142 minors   (8)   4,182.8   29.5 
342 servants (20)   7,295.9   21.3
  56 labourers   (3)      748.4   13.4
    8 friendly societies   (0)      298.2   37.3
    7 charitable societies   (0)      910.0 130.0
1749 in total  64,876.8   37.1
Source: Campbell Foster, Letters, 494
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 5: SAVINGS PATTERNS IN THE UK, 1850
Country Deposits Withdrawals Avg . deposit   Avg. withdrawal
per account per account £     s    d     £     s     d
England and Wales       1.1     0.5 5   17    2    14    2    7½
Scotland       1.8     1.0 3   18    0      5    9    4
Ireland       1.5     1.0 8   15   10½      8    6    8½
Source:  BPP, 1852b.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 6: SAVINGS BANKS IN ENGLAND/WALES  AND IRELAND, 1828/9 AND 1845/6
Number     Accounts      Deposits Population Av. Deposit
      (1,000s)        (£ m.)      (m.)      (£)
  1828/9
E & W 403          378       13.52      17    35.8
Ireland  65            32         0.91     8.5    28.4
   1845/6
E & W 515         1015       28.95      17    28.5
Ireland  76            93         2.79     8.5    30.0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 7: THE FIRST ACCOUNT HOLDERS
Date Name Details Amount (£)
14 dec 29 (*) Thomas Kirwan aged 30, TSB treasurer    1
14 dec  (*) William Ryan in trust for Mary Ann Ryan    1
14 dec  (*) James Butler medical practitioner    1
14 dec  (*) Thomas Kirwan in trust for Philip Kirwan    1
21 dec  (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Master Richard Hoops, age 9 1 10s 0d
21 dec  (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Master Alex Hoops, age 7 1 10s 0d
21 dec Bridget Shea Thurles   30
21 dec Bridget Shea for Eleanor Shea,  age 2   30
21 dec Bridget Shea for Thomas Shea, age 6 months   30
21 dec   Bridget Shea for husband   30
28 dec Michael Mullally Thurles     7
4 jan 30 Bridget Shea for niece (M. Lyons), age 9   30
4 jan  (*) William Ryan for Thomas Ryan, age 2     1
11 jan (*) William Ryan for Daniel Fogarty, age 40 4 10s 0d
11 jan (*) Rev William Byrne for Michael Brennan, age about 40   30
11 jan (*) William Ryan for William Ryan, age 1     1
11 jan (*) Adam Cooke for Charles, age 19 2 5s 0d
18 jan (*) Adam Cooke for John Bryan, Thurles, age 30 4 10s 0d
18 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Miss Jane Lee   10
18 jan (*) Charles O ￿Keeffe for Fanny, age 20   10
18 jan (*) Charles O ￿Keeffe for Mary, age 18   10
18 jan James Mara age 30   30
18 jan William Mara Maxfort, Moycarkey, age 35   30
18 jan (*) Thomas Molony Maxfort, Moycarkey, age 40    1
18 jan Richard Walsh Brownstown, age 30   20
18 jan (*) Thomas Maher Commons, age 50   30
18 jan (*) Hugh Mulcahy Esq. for Judith Neill   30
18 jan (*) Hugh Mulcahy Esq.   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Benjamin, age 10   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke  for Mary, age 8   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke  for William, age 5   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Sarah, age 4   30
18 jan (*) Archibald Cooke for Archibald, age 6   30
18 jan Eugene Sullivan chandler, 35 1  1s 0d
18 jan Edward Flaherty tobacconist    1
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Miss Nicholson sr    2
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong  for Alex Hoops 0  2s 0d
25 jan (*) Rev Henry Armstrong for Richard Hoops 0  2s 0d
25 jan James Callahan age 40    5
25 jan Thomas Ryan Inch, age 16    1
25 jan Judith Fogarty married woman 0  1s 0d
25 jan Jerh Fogerty age 40   30
1 feb Judith McGuire widow, 60   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for Catherine McGuire, age 18   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for daughterr Elizabeth, age 23   30
1 feb Judith McGuire  for son William, age 21   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan age 35   301 feb Thomas Flanagan for mother   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan for wife   30
1 feb Thomas Flanagan for daughter, age 6 months   30
1 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Mary Grace, servant 20  1s 0d
1 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Michael Hayes, shopman, age 18   12
8 feb Edmund Ryan dealer, age 50   10
8 feb Michael Delany steward, age 30   16
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Johanna Quigly, age 20   16
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Edmund Fitzgibbon 7  6s 6d
8 feb (*) Thomas Kirwan for Ellen Fitzgerald 8 14 1d
8 feb Philip Heaney Ballinahow, Holycross, age 30   18





TABLE 10: ACCOUNTS CLOSED 1853-8
1853-1855 Feb-Mar 1856   1857-58
Number 199     75 191
Female  (%) 45.7 46.7 37.7
Avg. Opening Balance (£) 17.5 20.7 19.0
Avg. Closing Balance (£)  23.3 29.8 28.1
Avg. Date open Oct 50 Dec 49             Nov 54
Thurles address (%) 34.4 36.7 37.7
In trust  (%) 32.7 38.7 44.0
Withdrew at same as another 
    with same surname/address (%) 23.6 50.7 40.3
Status or occupation where given (%)
Farming (incl family)  30.1  47.9 28.2
Labourers, servants, dealers, etc.  11.5  18.3 10.7
Married women, widows, spinsters  26.9  20.0 27.5
Minors    5.4    4.2 13.0
Gents, corndealers, doctors    5.4    1.4   6.9
RIC    5.4    1.4   2.3
Other  14.6    6.8 10.7
100.0 100.0 100.0
Not given    69    19 59
_____________________________________________________________________
                                                                              
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 11: CLOSURES BEFORE AND DURING THE PANIC OF 1848
Closed Closed            Closed Closed Open in March  ￿48
1844-5     Jan  ￿47-Mar  ￿48       Apr-Sept  ￿48          1849-51  but did not close
Number 341  384  322 310 482
Female  (%) 41.1 38.8 41.0 45.5 41.9
Avg. Opening Balance (£) 18.7 20.0 21.3 18.0 19.4
Avg. Closing Balance (£)  23.6 26.5 29.7 18.4 32.4
Avg. Date open Sept 40 Aug 43 Dec 43 Dec 44 Sept 41
Address in Thurles (%) 41.9 43.0 35.4 47.7 39.4
      Moycarkey (%)   7.0  8.6   9.3   8.0
      Holycross (%)   6.5 10.2 12.8   6.5
      Drom (%)   6.7  9.1   7.8   7.1
In trust  (%) 41.1 47.4 47.8 47.7 37.3
Withdrew in same month as another 
   with same surname/address (%) 22.9 38.3 43.5 21.6   --
Status or occupation (%)
   Farming (incl family) 40.4  44.6  47.5 35.3  32.2
   Labourers, servants, dealers, etc. 16.4  12.9  13.2 11.3  10.7
   Married women, widows, spinsters 20.8  20.9  19.0 24.0  16.2
   Minors  4.8    9.4    7.0  6.3    8.1
   Gents, corndealers, doctors  8.0    1.7    2.5  8.0    3.7
   RIC  1.6    2.1    0.4  2.5    2.7
   Other given  8.0    8.3   10.3 12.6    8.9
   Total given 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Not given  91     97     80 72    83
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 12: PROFILES OF THURLES ACCOUNT HOLDERS 1829-1870
STATUS    NO.   AVG. OPENING     AVG. CLOSING   AVG. MAX         TOTAL AVG. NO. AVG. NO.     AVG. AVG.
      BALANCE (£)        BALANCE (£)  BALANCE (£)          DEPOSITS (£) LDGMTS WTHDRLS  DURATION TRANS.
Baker     25   7   13      17 24  12.4    2.3 1.8 8.2
Servant   215   8   13      18 24    4.9    2.2  5.2 1.4
Labourer     83 13   13      19 29    3.9    3.4  3.4 2.1
Tailor     15   8   14      18 26    4.8    3.8 2.8 3.1
Dealer     30 13   17      27 46    7.4    5.3 4.1 3.1
Esquire     57 24   32      47 75    4.3    2.3 4.1 1.6
Landowner     26 21   46      54 64    3.8    2.4  3.9 1.6
Farmer   574 24   31      41 55    3.0    2.4  4.4 1.3
Farmer ￿s dr.   136 23   32      40 47    2.3    1.2 4.2 0.8
Farmer ￿s son   205 25   35      43 54    2.4    1.2 5.2 0.7
Farmer ￿s wife   169 23   35      44 50    2.6    1.6 4.6 0.9
Minor   262 18   29      38 48    5.9    1.7 5.5 1.4
Policeman     86 16   27      32 34    4.0    1.9 4.2 1.4
Married woman  323 18   25      33 45    5.4    2.2  3.6 2.1
Spinster   349 19   29      36 47    5.6    1.7 4.3 1.7
Widow   112 20   23      34 42    3.4    3.4 4.6 1.5
Catholic curate    36 22   25      34 42    2.5    1.8 3.5 1.2
Male 2387 20   26      34 44    3.8    2.0 4.0 1.5
Female 1826 17   25      32 40    4.5    1.9 4.2 1.5
Total 4213 19   26      33 43    4.2    2.0 4.1 1.5
Thurles 1768 16   21      29 40    5.8    2.3 3.8 2.1
Other 2445 21   29      37 44    2.9    1.7 4.3 1.1
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________